## City of Chula Vista

Pension Cost Management Strategies \& policy Considerations

## Executive Summary

- City issued $\$ 350 \mathrm{M}$ of Pension Obligation Bonds ("POB") in February 2021 to refinance \& restructure its CalPERS Unfunded Actuarial Liability ("UAL")
- Objectives included cash flow savings and smoothing pension payments to enhance fiscal sustainability
- New \$85M UAL (6/30/2022 CalPERS Report)
- After POB, City benefited from initial CalPERS investment generating $\sim \$ 116 \mathrm{M}$ surplus (overfunded)
- New UAL payments start FY 2024-25
- CaIPERS FY 2022-23 Investment Returns: 6.1\%
- Loss will increase UAL to ~\$100M (6/30/2023 CalPERS Report)
- Considerations for managing future Pension \& General Fund Debt Liabilities:
- Update Pension \& OPEB Reserve Fund Policy to provide flexibility of POB Bond Call Reserve
- Section 115 Trust Smoothing and Additional Discretionary Payments ("ADPs") can help stabilize pension cost volatility


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I. Background on CALPERS Costs

## Background on How CalPERS Works <br> Two Payments Made to CaIPERS Annually

( 1 ) Normal Cost ("NC") = Annual cost for current employees

- (2) Unfunded Accrued Liability ("UAL"): Annual payment to amortize the "debt" to CalPERS
- UAL is amortized over 20 years
- New UAL is created when CalPERS investment returns <6.80\%



# UAL Comprises Multiple Layers With Own Size, Shape and Term <br> New Layers Added Every Year Impacting Overall Shape of Repayment 

| Reason for <br> Base | Ramp <br> Shape | Term |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | Size of Base

Hypothetical amortization bases shown for presentation purposes.


## Why CalPERS Contribution Costs Have Trended Higher

## Then (late 1990s)...

- Robust investment returns (10\%+)
- Retirement plans were "SuperFunded" through the 1990s
- Investment Earnings cover retirement costs
- Lower Contribution Requirements Allowed Benefit Enhancements
- Past funding policies led to contribution holidays and "free" benefit improvements


## Now ...

- Investment Returns Not Meeting Assumptions
- Assumptions have changed
- Discount Rate: $8.25 \% \rightarrow 7.00 \% \rightarrow \underline{6.80 \%}$
- Inflation rate (prices going up)
- Mortality rates (people living longer)
- Actuarial Valuation $\rightarrow$ Market Valuation
- Shorter, more conservative amortizations
- UAL payments have grown rapidly from past changes, remain exposed to the effects from future poor investment returns and assumption changes


## How Retirement Benefits Get Funded

## Money Going In vs. Money Going Out

Employee Contributions: $\approx 11-13 \%$
Employer Contributions: ~29-32\%

- Normal Cost: Payments to keep up with current employees
- UAL: Payments to amortize the Unfunded Accrued Liability


## Investment Earnings: $\approx 55-60 \%$

- Investment earnings used to make up a higher percentage (>65-70\%) of total contributions (pre2008)
- As investments underperform assumptions, employers must make up the difference



## Retirement Benefits \& Plan Expenses

## Background - Retirement Plans

- 2 Main CalPERS plans
- Miscellaneous: 2,552 covered members
- Public Safety: 960 covered members
- PEPRA helpful to manage long term pension costs for new employees
- However, over 99\% of current UAL is estimated to come from Classic plans and not reduced by PEPRA

| MISCELLANEOUS PLANS |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Benefit Group | \# of Actives | \% of Actives | Benefit Formula |
| Miscellaneous First Level | 272 | $37.9 \%$ | $3 \%$ @ 60 |
| Miscellaneous Second Level | 52 | $7.3 \%$ | $2 \%$ @ 60 |
| PEPRA Miscellaneous | 393 | $54.8 \%$ | $2 \%$ @ 62 |
| Total Active Members | $\mathbf{7 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | - |
| Total Covered Members | $\mathbf{2 , 5 5 2}$ | $\mathbf{-}$ | $\mathbf{-}$ |


| PUBLIC SAFETY |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Benefit Group | \# of Actives | \% of Actives | Benefit Formula |
| Public Safety First Level | 166 | $42.3 \%$ | $3 \%$ @ 50 |
| Public Safety Second Level | 30 | $7.7 \%$ | $3 \%$ @ 5 |
| Public Safety PEPRA | 196 | $50.0 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ @ 57 |
| Total Active Members | $\mathbf{3 9 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | - |
| Total Covered Members | 960 | - | - |

II. Historical and Projected CalPERS Costs

Historical \& Projected UAL + 2021 Pension Obligation Bond Payments


## Total Projected Pension Payments (UAL + Normal Cost + POB)

- Annual Normal Cost Contributions ~\$19M through 2045
- Total pension payments projected to increase to \$51M (2035)
- Max @ \$55M (2044)
- Pension costs as \% of General Fund budget projected to increase through 2030
- FY 2023-24 pension payment accounts for 13.2\% of total General Fund budget
- UAL payments start in FY 2024-25


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## III. Recap of City’s 2021 Pension Obligation BoNDS

## 2021 Pension Obligation Bonds

## Summary of Strategy

## - Strategy:

- Restructure UAL over 24 years
- Bond Stats:
- All-In Cost: 2.54\%
, \$158M PV Savings*


## , Goals:

- Maximize cash flow savings

- Absorb future UAL "shocks"
- Create pension funding policy


## What Happened After the 2021 POB?

-7.5\% Investment Returns in 2022 and 6.1\% in 2023


# IV. Potential Pension Cost Management Strategies 

## Cost-Containment Strategies - Not Mutually Exclusive

## (1) Prepay UAL early in Fiscal Year ( $\approx 3.3 \%$ discount)

## (2) Negotiate Cost Sharing With Employees

- Require employees to pay their share; new employees already governed by lower cost/benefit PEPRA plans
- Negotiated cost sharing of the City's share


## (3) Voluntary Fresh Start Amortization offered by CalPERS

- Pros: Smooths payment, shortens repayment period; reduces overall interest paid from shorter amortization period
- Cons: New structure "locked-in" + increased annual payments in near term; still amortized at discount rate
(4) Use Cash Reserves to Pay Extra (two options)
- Section 115 Trust - Separate trust solely dedicated to pension/OPEB $\rightarrow$ City has a $\$ 25.7 M$ (as of 6/30/2023) Section 115 Pension Trust
- $\underline{\text { ADP - Reduce UAL through direct lump sum payment to CalPERS }}$
- Choose optimal amortization bases to pay off


## (5) Restructure All or Portion of Remaining UAL

- Restructure portion of UAL at lower bond interest rate and "smooth out" payments for enhanced budget predictability, near and mid-term potential savings, and preservation of cash for other critical projects


## Additional Discretionary Payment ("ADP")

- What is it? City makes ADP directly to CaIPERS and CalPERS eliminates payments associated with the portion of the UAL paid off, essentially giving the City credit at the discount/interest rate (currently 6.8\%)
- The proceeds from the City's 2021 POB were essentially used to make a very large ADP
- Advantages:
- Reduced UAL / higher CaIPERS funding ratio
- Reduced future payments
- Broader, less restrictive CaIPERS investment portfolio has potential for higher returns
- Disadvantages:
* Requires reserves / surplus to fund
- Re-investment and market timing risk with ADP funds
- Less budgetary flexibility and investment control (vs. Section 115 Trust option)


## Section 115 Trust

- What is it? Restricted Account for pension/OPEB


## - Advantages:

- Potential Higher Investment Returns in Managed Account
- Longer-Term Benefit: Trust funds can grow over time and pay off a large \% of UAL in the future
- Shorter-Term Benefit: Apply funds to "smooth" payment spikes in UAL and/or Normal Cost
- Flexibility - more investment options than CalPERS and the City can decide when and how to use
- Potential shock absorber for volatility from CalPERS investment performance \& assumption changes


## - Disadvantages:

- Doesn't directly reduce UAL until funds are transferred to CaIPERS
- Requires reserves/surplus contributions to build account balance
- Investment risk (dependent on type of investment portfolio)


## Background \& Concept

- The City has built up a Section 115 Trust balance of $\$ 25.7$ million (as of $6 / 30 / 2023$ ) that is on track to meet the City's policy target of $15 \%$ of General Fund expenses


## Section 115 Smoothing:

- City can grow its Section 115 Trust balance and selectively withdraw funds in future years to smooth and manage annual pension payments at lower levels
- The City's annual UAL payment is projected to be covered by POB savings for the next several years, allowing the Trust balance to grow uninterrupted for the next several years
- This smoothing strategy can be executed in conjunction with other cost management strategies, including ADPs and pension bond paydowns


## Comparison of Section 115 Trust \& CalPERS ADP

| OPTION | Section 115 Trust | Calpers Adp |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reduced UAL \& UAL Payments with CalPERS | No | Yes |
| Reduced Pension Liability in Financial Statements | No (but Trust will show up as an asset on the City's financial statements) | Yes |
| Control of Investment Strategy | Yes | No |
| Funds Managed By | Trust Administrator (PARS for the City's Trust) | CalPERS |
| Flexibility in Uses | Yes | No |
| Enhanced Budgetary Flexibility | Yes | Limited |
| Savings | Varies; Depends on when City utilizes funds to pay liabilities | Immediate; Length of time varies based on which amortization bases are paid off |
|  | 21 | NHA $\mid$ ADVISORS |

## Additional Cost Savings Considerations

## Section 115 Smoothing vs. ADPs

- While applying funds toward a Section 115 Trust or ADPs are both proactive approaches for UAL cost management, there are a few additional considerations:
- Section 115:
- Assets remain accessible as a balance sheet asset in the event unexpected needs arise
- Supports flexible drawdown approaches for managing and smoothing annual pension costs
- While providing access to potentially higher-earning investment opportunities than LAIF, a more conservative investment strategy may not create the same nominal benefit as paying down $6.8 \%$ UAL with CalPERS
- CalPERS ADPs:
- Directly pays down UAL with CaIPERS, boosting funding ratios
- Reduces future UAL payments with credit at a $6.8 \%$ interest (i.e. discount) rate
- Proceeds sent to CalPERS, however, cannot be clawed back
- Ability to smooth future UAL payments subject to shape of individual UAL amortization base layers
- Given City's current funding ratios (92-93\%), potential "super" funding of plans should be kept in mind


## V. Policy Considerations

## Overview of City’s Reserve Policy

- Comprehensive Reserve Policy revised and adopted in November 2020
- Provides funding mechanism and flow of funds priority for 6 distinct reserves / funds
- Pension Reserve Fund, OPEB Fund, and POB Bond Call Reserve were developed to address future pension and OPEB costs and potentially pay off the 2021 POBs prior to maturity


## Potential Policy Changes for Consideration



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## Considerations for Reserve Policy \& Pension Cost Management

## Re-evaluating Scope of POB Bond Call Reserve

- Expand the scope of the POB bond call reserve to encompass other more expensive City/General-Fund debt, including potential Lease Revenue Bond/COP issues \& UAL
- Allows City to 1) increase financial benefit from intended interest cost savings and 2) pay down outstanding debt sooner than allowable for the 2021 POB (2031 par call)
- Surplus from the PRF flows to the OPEB and POB bond call reserves, and the City can consider adjusting the PRF target if it would like to allocate more/less toward restricted pension funds
- Higher PRF balance allows for more impactful cost-smoothing strategies, but more restricted funds
- City can maintain PRF target balance while proactively addressing future pension costs by allocating remaining surpluses first towards ADPs or smoothing annual pension payments
- Once target plan funded ratios are achieved, additional surpluses can flow to other buckets


## Additional Policy Considerations

- Expanding Bond Call Reserve Policy to allow savings opportunities
- Allows for one-time monies to be used for one-time expenditures
- Can be used to call bonds before final maturity, providing ongoing budgetary savings in future years
- City can prioritize surpluses after funding the Section 115 Trust toward annual CaIPERS ADPs to increase plans' funded ratios (95\%-100\%) before building up the Bond Call and OPEB Reserve
- Achieves greater total savings than paying down an equivalent amount of 2021 POBs
- Enables City to proactively address scheduled pension cost increases at more manageable levels


## Analysis Scenario \#1: Pension \& OPEB Reserve Policy Status Quo

## Scenario \#1 Summary

- In Scenario \#1, NHA assumes surplus funds flow through the City’s Reserve Policy as established
- NHA calculates that the City would have $\$ 29.8$ million in its Bond Call Reserve to partially pay down the POB at first optional redemption on June 1, 2031
- Assumes pay down of longest maturities on the POB to maximize savings


## Net Savings for Scenario \#1



## Scenario \#1 Net Payments



- Projected UAL Payments (CaIPERS Pension Outlook Tool)* - Scenario \#1 Net Payments
*Pension Outlook Tool assumes FY 2022-23 returns of 6.1\% and 6.80\% returns from FY 2023-24 onward. 6.1\% is the money-weighted rate of return reported by CaIPERS in its FY 2022-23 Annual Comprehensive Financial Report.


## Analysis Scenario \#2: Proposed Reserve \& OPEB Policy

## Scenario \#2 Summary

- In Scenario \#2, NHA assumes ADPs are made with some of the surplus that would previously flow to the Bond Call and OPEB Reserve
- Targets an approximate $95 \%$ funded ratio before surplus resumes flowing to the Bond Call and OPEB Reserve
- City would make ADPs (from surpluses) in fiscal years 2024 - 2027, totaling $\$ 28.8$ million
- From 2028-2031, remaining surpluses would build up the City’s Bond Call Reserve to \$18.7 million, which would be used to partially pay down the POB at first optional redemption on June 1, 2031


## Net Savings for Scenario \#2



## Scenario \#2 Net Payments



Comparison of Scenario \#1 and \#2

## Scenarios Analysis: Summary

- The difference in potential savings is attributable to how much higher costing debt (e.g., UAL vs. POB) is being paid down
* Note: While ADPs pay down $6.8 \%$ debt with CalPERS, the ADPs are invested by CalPERS and are subject to future CalPERS returns
- More funds are used in Scenario \#2 because ADPs will theoretically lower future UAL payments and free up more surplus to be used for additional ADPs
- Paying down more UAL generates higher projected savings, however the City could see reduced upside potential from any long-term overfunding scenarios if CalPERS achieves sustained outperformances


## Net Savings Comparison

| Scenario \#: | \#1 Status Quo | \#2 Proposed | Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gross Savings: | $\$ 41,574,933$ | $\$ 80,404,818$ | $\$ 38,829,885$ |
| Funds Used: | $(\$ 29,781,632)$ | $(\$ 47,464,284)$ | $(\$ 17,682,652)$ |
| Net Savings: | $\mathbf{\$ 1 1 , 7 9 3 , 3 0 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 2 , 9 4 0 , 5 3 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 1 , 1 4 7 , 2 3 3}$ |

## Scenario Comparison



## VI. Conclusion

## Takeaways

- Rising pension costs are a challenge facing most public agencies, and the City has tackled the challenge through strategies such as:
- Issuing a strategic POB in a low interest rate environment
- Establishing a pension funding policy
- Building up Section 115 Trust reserves
- However, the UAL challenge has returned mainly due to recent poor CaIPERS investment returns, potentially increasing the City's UAL to \$100M
- To assist with proactive pension and General Fund debt management, the City can consider the following:
- Expand the scope of its POB Bond Call Reserve to encompass more expensive debt
- Leverage POB net savings to make direct ADPs to CalPERS to pay down UAL
- Consider target funded ratios


## Consolidate Various Council

 Policies into a Single Citywide Reserve PolicyMay 28, 2024

## Summary of Proposed Policy Changes

## Consolidation of Reserve Policies

2 Change in Calculation of Reserve Level

## Updated Funding Allocation \& Uses

## Consolidation of Reserve Policies

Citywide Reserve Policy

- General Fund
- Pension \& OPEB
- Measure A Fund
- Sewer Service Fund
- Ambulance Transport Fund



## Change in Calculation of Reserve Level

## Prior Year's Budget instead of Future Year's Budget.

Clarification of Operating Expenditures


## Updated Funding Allocation \& Uses



[^0]issuance of the POBs

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## Policy Comparison

## POB and UAL Payment and Savings*

(in millions)

|  | Current |  | Proposed |  | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Additional Discretionary Payment | \$ | - | \$ | 28.8 | \$ | 28.8 |
| Bond Call Payment |  | 29.8 |  | 18.7 |  | (11.1) |
| Total Payments | \$ | 29.8 | \$ | 47.5 | \$ | 17.7 |
| ADP Savings | \$ | - | \$ | 54.2 | \$ | 54.2 |
| Bond Call Savings |  | 41.5 |  | 26.2 |  | (15.3) |
| Total Savings | \$ | 41.5 | \$ | 80.4 | \$ | 38.9 |
| Net Savings | \$ | (11.7) | \$ | (32.9) | \$ | (21.2) |

## General Fund Long-Term Financial Plan

|  | Adopted | Projected |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 |
| Major Discretionary Revenues | \$ 219.0 | \$ 229.3 | \$ 231.5 | \$217.6 | \$ 224.7 | \$ 232.1 | \$ 239.7 | \$247.6 | \$ 255.7 | \$264.1 |
| Other Revenues | 55.2 | 55.9 | 56.7 | 57.5 | 57.8 | 58.0 | 58.8 | 59.6 | 60.5 | 61.4 |
| New Development Revenues | - | 2.7 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.7 |
| Total General Fund Revenues | \$ 274.1 | \$287.9 | \$ 291.7 | \$278.9 | \$ 286.5 | \$ 294.1 | \$ 302.7 | \$311.6 | \$ 320.7 | \$330.2 |
| Personnel Services Expenditures | \$ 147.3 | \$ 156.6 | \$ 164.8 | \$171.1 | \$ 177.5 | \$ 183.1 | \$ 188.0 | \$ 193.3 | \$ 198.9 | \$ 204.3 |
| Other Expenditures | 126.8 | 126.4 | 121.1 | 99.6 | 100.5 | 102.4 | 105.0 | 104.0 | 106.5 | 106.7 |
| New Development Expenditures | - | 5.3 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.5 |
| Total General Fund Expenditures | \$ 274.1 | \$ 288.2 | \$ 292.4 | \$277.7 | \$ 285.4 | \$ 293.3 | \$300.9 | \$305.5 | \$ 313.8 | \$319.5 |
| General Fund Surplus / (Deficit) | - | (0.3) | (0.7) | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 10.7 |
| Estimated Balances | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 |
| Pension Reserve Fund | \$ 32.3 | \$ 33.6 | \$ 35.0 | \$ 36.1 | \$ 37.3 | \$ 38.5 | \$ 39.8 | \$ 41.0 | \$ 42.4 | \$ 43.8 |
| Balance of Bond Call Fund | - | - | - | 4.9 | 9.2 | 13.8 | 18.7 | - | - | - |
| Balance of OPEB Reserve | - | - | - | 1.6 | 3.1 | 4.6 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 |

## Recommended Action

Approve the "Resolution of the City Council of the City of Chula Vista amending and repealing various City Council Policies related to reserves into a consolidated Citywide Reserve Policy"

## Consolidate Various Council

 Policies into a Single Citywide Reserve PolicyMay 28, 2024


[^0]:    *75\% of the net annual savings from the

